The state of Syria is a complicated one to assess. After the collapse of the Assad regime last December, and the subsequent appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa as President on 29th January, the nation is in a state of political limbo, caught between both potential stability and a relapse of mass civil unrest. The current rebel coalition has made promising strides, from completing a national dialogue process and signing agreements with the Syrian defence forces. This article will analyse the political strategy of the interim government, from managing constitutional reform and violent attacks in the coastal regions, as well as the extent to which renewed social liberties indicates a marked change towards a legitimate, technocratic regime, something which Syria has not seen since 2011.
The Constitutional Dilemma
Over the past 4 months, Al-Sharaa, current President and leader of the Islamist military group Hay’at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS), has made impressive efforts to stabilise the transitional government, issuing pledges to extinguish military factions and implement impartial elections. This kind of revolutionary tone is a distinct departure from the political condition of Syria’s nearby nations, of which the likes of Libya and Yemen remain in violent desolation, with little attempt to establish a renewed administration. That said, the longevity of the regime is still undetermined, with violent outbreaks and doubts over the centralisation of Al-Sharaa’s power remaining an obstacle in fully integrating into the international network.
Specifically, the constitutional declaration announced in January has allowed the president absolute control over the appointments of the cabinet and the Constitutional Court, a critical caveat in preventing a sense of alienation among the people to political modernity. Al-Sharaa himself is cognisant the current spirit of revolution is only temporary, in spite of new social freedom being enjoyed. The declaration also failed to enshrine the separation of powers, a fundamental aspect to a legitimate democracy. In this sense, though the illusion of a technocratic government has been created, in real terms, diverse political participation is yet to be seen.
Reform or Relapse?
Following the HSF offensive which overthrew the Assad regime on 8 December, the streets of Syria exulted, the sudden toppling of half a century of Assad ruling appeared to mark a defiant moment in Syria, an end to civil war under an authoritarian dictator. At this moment, a resurgence in cultural art, orchestral performances and open political dialogue indicates a promising trajectory for Al-Sharaa, with leading Syrian journalists and academics returning in the wake of his interim government. Simultaneously, the presence of women within the transitional government perhaps signal a wider issue of HTS imposing a narrower view of Islamic law, with only one woman being appointed within the entire cabinet. Whilst some observers believe an impending Islamic state will be established, the possibility of this is highly limited in a time where Al-Sharaa is primarily concerned with unifying the Syrian diaspora. What could pose a problem to these civic liberties however, are both the pro Assad revenge fighters and hardliner jihadist critics of Al-Sharaa. In particular, after HTS announced amnesty to former army conscripts in December, many faulted the decision as conflicting with Sharia law, with some seeking revenge as vigilantes.
A Fragile Consensus
Violence further escalated on March 6, in which Assad loyalists attacked security control in Jableh, resulting in 147 casualties. The attack came after Alawites (a large proportion of Assad loyalists under the former regime) were entirely removed from government positions combined with severe structural neglect within those communities. These instances partially stem from Al- Sharaa’s insufficient inclusion of political groups, amplifying animosity in an already tenuous moment for Syria, both domestically and globally. With the nation suspended in both unrest and hope for continued recovery, Al-Sharaa must prioritise implementing security structures before militant engagement becomes beyond containment.