Tensions in South Sudan have yet again escalated over the course of this year, with the risk of plunging into civil war growing more likely. After vice president Machar’s arrest, instigated by South Sudan’s president, Kiir, political upheaval has ensued, with 92% of the East African nation now in poverty, military engagement scaling in Juba and the Upper Nile, as well as the controversial involvement of Uganda. This article will examine the regional impacts of this increasingly precarious conflict, characterised by deep interethnic tensions, a dilapidated peace agreement and a somewhat passive approach of key Western actors.
A Critical Juncture
Though the arrests of Machar and his leadership last month have brought about international attention to South Sudan's fragile political situation, such unrest has been steadily mounting over the course of this year. In January, those fleeing Western Equatoria reported Kiir’s government conducted an unprovoked attack on Machar’s troops. It was just in February when Machar, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), launched an accusation against Kiir’s government of orchestrating the 22 baseless arrests of his political and military allies.
In response, the South Sudanese government continued to arrest Machar’s key colleagues after a military base was seized by the White Army, who are closely affiliated with the SPLA-IO opposition. It was the militia attack on a U.N helicopter in Nasir however which marked a flashpoint in the conflict. The peacekeeping mission, thwarted by the White Army in a series of shootings, ended in 28 casualties, thus leading to Machar’s detainment on 26th March.
This aggravation of an already hostile political environment has propelled South Sudan to the edge of civil war. That said, the world’s youngest nation has continually faced instability, often rooted in ethnic division. Specifically, Kiir’s government is largely composed of the Dinka community, the largest ethnic minority group in South Sudan, whilst Machar’s opposition is predominantly the second largest ethnic minority group, the Nuer community. This, combined with wavering military influence of Machar, has left Kiir an opportune political asset, leveraging the actions of the White Army to weaken the SPLA-IO opposition leadership entirely.
A Tenuous Peace Agreement
The perpetual violations of the 2018 peace agreement, largely driven by Kiir’s leadership, has left both Dinka and Nuer communities in a state of chaos. Machar’s waning popularity is also largely due to his failure to implement the security terms of the agreement, leaving the White Army as a somewhat independent militia, often engaging in alternative political agendas. The obvious decentralisation of power evident in South Sudan has left Machar devoid of the coordination needed to tame inflamed ethnic tensions. That said, Kiir’s arrest of Machar and his political coalition is the ultimate breach of the peace agreement, in particular the power sharing arrangement.
The appointment of Bol Mel as vice president and deputy chair of the SPLM has also stirred tensions among the people of South Sudan. Bol Mel, regarded as the likely successor of Kiir, is not only a relatively junior figure in terms of political experience and condemned by the U.S government for allegations of corruption, but is also Kiir’s son-in-law, typifying the brazen dismissal of the peace agreement, established to extinguish the possibility of another civil war. The South Sudanese people are especially inflamed by the lack of implementation regarding the security arrangement.
Instead of a coalition of former rebel forces and government soldiers as part of a national army, militia still remain politically motivated and yet to be demobilised. The prospect of next year's election has been shattered by the recent events, leaving the population suspended in ethnic conflicts, of which the government is partially fueling.
Regional Upheaval
Sudan, engaged in their own civil war currently, further amplifies regional tensions, specifically for Kiir’s leadership as oil exports have been severely hampered. An influxion of returnees of South Sudan has contributed to military scaling, with recruitments for both RSF fighters and SPLM-IO forces occurring. Though diplomatic efforts have been made to encourage dialogue between Machar and Kiir, with visits from the African Union and other regional leaders taking place in March, no concrete evidence for imminent peace has been found. Western actors on the other hand, including Germany and Norway, have closed their embassies in the region, with the U.S evacuating a large portion of staff. The involvement of Uganda, though initially viewed as promising in de-escalating tensions, appears more inclined to align with Kiir’s leadership.
Historically, Kiir has harnessed the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) to secure stability and counter SPLAIO opposition. At this moment, the shifting regional dynamics surrounding South Sudan only convolute the political trajectory of the nation. Whilst such instability is not unfamiliar, the successive conflicts between Dinka and Nuer communities, combined an emerging crisis of Kiir’s government, such factors may catalyse the young nation into another civil war.